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Abstract—As personal information and context sharing appli-
cations gain traction more attention is drawn to the associated
privacy issues. These applications address privacy using an
unsatisfactory “whitelist” approach, similar to social networks
“friends”. Some of them also link location publishing with user
interaction which is also a form of privacy control - the user
has to explicitly say where he is. There are a few automatic
location based-services (LBS) that track the user, but without
more adequate privacy protection mechanisms they enable even
bigger threats to the user. On previous work, an XMPP-based
Context Distribution Architecture was defined, more suitable for
the distribution of frequently changing context than other systems
because it is based on the publish-subscribe pattern. In this paper
the authors present an extension to this architecture that allows
for the introduction of a complex degree of access control in
context distribution. The devised changes enable the system to
consider a number of interesting context privacy settings for
context distribution control. Also, this control must be enforced
in a way that it doesn’t interfere with the real-time nature of
the distribution process. After describing the enhancements to
the architecture, a prototype of the system is presented. Finally,
the delivery latency and additional processing introduced by the
access control components is estimated by testing it against the
existing system.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is still no comprehensive technological solution for
addressing privacy in systems that make use of context
information. An example of this are today’s commercially
available location sharing applications. In these applications
access control is done by simply “whitelisting” [1] [2] users,
enabling them to see the shared information. Furthermore,
most of these applications require explicit user action for
publishing information. The user has to say where he is from
a location-aware list of places, an action commonly referred
to as a “check-in”. This is also a form of privacy protection
since permanently tracking the user without further control
is intrusive and uncommon [3]. However, in the future we
will be sharing not only to people but also to the entities
that administer the devices around us. Such entities will use
this context information to adapt our physical and digital
environment. This implies two things: first, the “check-in”
technique currently used in most location sharing applica-
tions is not an option, and second, the latency performance
requirements for the context distribution become tighter. The
maximum delivery latency depends on the type and precision
of the supplied context: more precise and dynamic context
information requires less latency. In this work we assume
that context information is only used for human-perceived
adaptation. For this reason, the tightest latency requirements
are bound by human reaction times. From the field of cognitive
psychology, we consider as a reference the value of 190
milliseconds for human visual reaction time [4].
We built upon previous work with a practical approach
to the problem, proving that it is possible to build such a
privacy-enabled context delivery system today. The prototype
and results presented in this paper show that it is possible to
use complex privacy settings in context distribution without
relevantly impacting the delivery latency. These complex pri-
vacy settings fit the user’s privacy expectations better than the
ones currently in use, enabling users concerned with privacy
to share more [5] [2]. Furthermore, a context delivery system
must have low context delivery latencies so that it can be used
for adaptation scenarios. We believe that these two points are
key enablers for the era of ambient intelligence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section we discuss related work on privacy-enabled context
delivery. In Section 3 the architecture and design directives
used to minimize the access control latency are discussed. In
Section 4 the implementation details are presented. In Section
5 the performance results of the new prototype are matched
against the pre-existing one. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude
and present possibilities for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The work presented in this document builds upon work
done in context management, context and personal information
privacy and access control. In this section the each of the
related work topics will be described, setting the ground for
our enhancements.
In the field of context management, Abowd, Dey and Salber
[6] propose a set of requirements for a context-enabling frame-
work: separation of concerns, context interpretation, transpar-
ent and distributed communications, constant availability of
context acquisition, context storage and history, and resource
discovery. A number of context management architectures
were presented over the last decade to address these problems
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[7]. A recent one put forward by Zafar et al. [8] gener-
ically addresses all the previously presented requirements.
It successfully decouples the sources from the consumers,
providing a discovery and communication platform between
them by defining 4 main components: Context Source, Context
Provider, Context Broker and Context Consumer. Furthermore
it defines architectural points for the storage, history and infer-
ence functions. However, due to its request-response approach,
it does not fully comply with the real-time requirements that
adaptation scenarios have. Additionally, if the system is to
be used globally, across trust domains, federation mechanisms
must be in place. The architecture introduced by Gomes et al.
[9] aims at solving these issues, while globally maintaining
the architectural constructs. The work makes use of XMPP
[10] as the main communication protocol because it responds
to the mentioned requirements through the direct use of an
existing standard.
Regarding context privacy work, location has enjoyed most
attention. Toch et al. [11] and Benisch et al. [2] consider a
location privacy preference model that uses not only whitelists
but also the location information value, time of day and
date. In their study, Benisch et al. measure the accuracy
with which different privacy settings are able to capture the
subject’s preferences. Results show that using detailed privacy
preferences such as date, time and location values leads to a
3 time increase in the accuracy of the settings, comparined
to using whitelist-based settings only. Other location privacy
work like the one by Ardagna et al. [12] use obfuscation
techniques, which consist of deliberately providing less precise
or even erroneous information. There is much done regarding
the definition of specific obfuscation techniques for each
context type. However, addressing context privacy generically
has not been thoroughly explored. Wishart et al. [13] present
a generic model for obfuscation, but different obfuscation
ontologies have to be defined for each context type, since for
each of them there are potentially different levels of detail that
can be considered. Although we intend to tackle both access
control and obfuscation approaches in our architecture, and to
apply both to any context information type, so far only the
first approach has been addressed. However, architecturally,
we anticipate that generic context obfuscation will be made
possible by the chaining of Context Providers. Regarding the
first privacy approach, we managed to filter generically by
context value with the use of a privacy settings format that
dynamically references the context information parameters.
Most access control systems implemented today are pro-
prietary and case specific. It was in order to bring some
portability and standards to the area that Extensible Access
Control Markup Language (XACML) [14] was developed.
Version 2, released in 2004, is completely mature and very
well known and version 3, released in 2010, is as of August
2011 in its first revision. It defines an architecture comprising
of 4 components:
• Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) - entity that gets the
request that needs to go through an access control check;
• Policy Decision Point (PDP) - central point of the ar-
chitecture, receives XACML requests from the PEP and
generates a decision, and subsequent response based on
the existing policies;
• Policy Administration Point (PAP) - supplies access con-
trol policies to the PDP;
• Policy Information Point (PIP) - supplies relevant infor-
mation to the PDP;
The main components are the PEP and the PDP. It is
between them that the access control requests and responses
flow. An XACML request represents a question: whether a
given subject can do a given action to a specific resource.
The PDP calculates the decision based on the policies it has.
XACML defines an XML format for the policies. A policy
refers to a target and contains a number of rules. Based on the
request information, the PDP navigates the policies looking for
a match in the target. When it does, it returns the associated
decision, permit or deny. Note that policies can be nested, so
combinatory algorithms may be used.
Work in the related areas is mature since context manage-
ment is an area targeted for over 10 years, and access control
has proven and widely adopted standards. Based on this work,
and most relevantly on the context management architecture
by Gomes et al. [9], we have built a prototype that implements
a novel access control scheme inspired by the privacy work
of Toch et al. [11].
III. ARCHITECTURE
As described by Gomes et al. [9], context is distributed
by publishing to certain ”nodes” to which context consumers
are subscribed. The nodes here play the role of resources:
in a request-response case a request would be sent to a
resource containing the targeted information. In traditional
access control the access decision is done per request based
on the requesting subject, the action being performed, the
targeted resource, and environment parameters such as date
and time [14]. However, in context distribution, in both for
request-response and publish-subscribe cases, the resource is
volatile: the values it contains change over time, in many cases
rather quickly. Since we are aiming at considering the context
values themselves for the decision, not only the resource
identifier, the traditional access control model needs to be
extended. In addition to this, the real-time nature of the context
distribution process cannot be debilitated by the implemented
access control mechanism.
Comparing to the original architecture, a component was
introduced in the architecture, depicted in Figure 1, the Privacy
Aggregator. This component is the user’s contact point for
choosing privacy settings, and it is necessary for two main
reasons. First, communicating the privacy setting implications
to the user is an important problem [5] that needs to be tackled
with specific solutions [2]. Second, for the conception of the
Privacy Aggregator relates to the concept and architectural
definition of a Context Provider. Since Context Providers
may belong to different entities, and a user typically interacts
with more than one Context Provider, having one of them
accessing the privacy preferences meant to another Provider
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Fig. 1. Architecture with Privacy-related Access Control
is not acceptable. The Privacy Aggregator must work as a
broker for specialized settings distribution. After the user sets
his privacy options the Privacy Aggregator is responsible for
separating them per provider and delivering them. Further-
more, the Privacy Aggregator is bound to perform a key role in
chaining different Context Providers for obfuscating context.
From the Context Providers’ description of context inference
and translation capabilities, the Privacy Aggregator can build
relationships between the available context types. Some of
these relationships will be obfuscations, and will replace the
statically defined ontologies of previous work. For example, if
a Context Provider exists that uses GPS location information
to infer the city the user is in, then the Privacy Aggregator
must associate this with the GPS Context Provider and take
it in account when asking the user for privacy settings for the
GPS context type. Finally, the question of what entity controls
the Privacy Aggregator, whether by the user or by some entity
that the user trusts (e.g., Identity Provider), is a subject for
future work.
Not only is publish-subscribe better than request-response
for context dissemination, due to the real-time requirements of
context-awareness scenarios, it is also more flexible regarding
access control. Request-response access control is done per
request, and even if no environment parameters are considered
- meaning that access decisions can be cached - there is always
a check required per request. In publish-subscribe the access
control can be enforced on subscription time, which happens
typically a small fraction of the number times that context
is required. Adopting his approach required changes in the
original Context Broker.
The notion of ”Context Profile” is introduced to ease the
definition of the context privacy settings. A Context Profile
refers to a context type and some optional privacy parameters:
conditions expressing the values, dates and times for which the
information can published, and an optional publishing delay.
Then, in his privacy settings, the user associates each context
profile to groups of entities that may be interested in taking
the role of context consumers.
It is possible to define several Context Profiles for the same
context type, even with privacy settings that are not mutually
exclusive. Consequently the same context information may be
distributed under different context profiles. Since the access
control is done at subscription time, each context profile
will necessarily correspond to a different publish-subscribe
node, even if the same information is being published. While
this brings an increase in the number of required nodes (or
resources), and some replication of information, it will also
reduce the context dissemination latency. It is a slight trade-
off from horizontal scalability (the same server with the same
processing power will typically support less users and load)
to latency performance (context change notifications are as
real-time as possible). By making this design choice, the only
access control processing required at publishing time is the
part of it that makes use of contextual information: context
values, date and time of day.
The most relevant sub-components and interactions are
depicted in Figure 2. The Privacy Aggregator provides the
Context Profiles and associated users (or user groups) to the
appropriate Context Providers, which implied changes in the
original Context Provider. Since a Context Profile is context
Fig. 2. Design specification based on cardinality relationships between context update, subscription and consumption
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Fig. 3. Main implementation modules
type specific it must be supplied to the Providers that publish
that type of context information, and only to those. The
Context Provider is responsible for managing the publish-
subscribe nodes it publishes to. It must create and destroy
them, based on privacy configuration changes, and manage
its associated access control policies - it plays the role of
an XACML PAP. It also is responsible for the contextual
checks required for discovering the appropriate nodes where
to publish. This last process happens once per context update.
The Context Broker only needs to enforce the defined node
access control policies, both when discovering and subscribing
to nodes. It plays both the PDP and PEP roles, although these
may be decoupled.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
For the prototype implementation we focused on the context
distribution elements of the architecture because these are the
ones that have an impact in the context delivery latency. The
Privacy Aggregator was minimally implemented, only provid-
ing the specialized privacy settings XML to the Provider.
The components were implemented based on existing and
new libraries. The implemented architectural components and
main implementation modules are depicted in Figure 3. The
Context Model is the module that allows parsing and un-
derstanding context information and it can be extended for
different types of context. The Context Privacy Model is the
module that allows parsing and understanding the defined
context privacy settings.
The context privacy settings define context profiles, as ex-
plained before. In the Context Privacy Model implementation
XML was used to serialize and transport the settings. The
settings represent conditions to be matched to context values,
date and time, in order to evaluate whether some context
update is to be published under that profile or not. Although an
extension mechanism was put in place for representing these
conditions, in this implementation only regular expressions
were used. An example of the preferences file is shown in
Example 1.
In this example there are two GPS location profiles defined.
The first one publishes location only in if the location is
within certain boundaries, in this case nearby the city of
Aveiro, where the user lives as depicted in Figure 4. The
second profile publishes GPS location within a certain date/-
time window: from 9:00AM to 19:59PM, from Monday to
Friday. The first profile is made available to the user’s home
appliances (air conditioning, water heating, ...), here identified
by “home@openfire”, for them to be able to detect when the
user is coming home. The second profile is made available to
his work colleagues, here represented by every entity in the
“openfire” domain.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<privacy user="jmgonc@openfire" xmlns="http://iex.ptin.pt/ctx/privacy
">
<privacyProfiles>
<profile id="1" name="GPS Tracking for Home Appliances">
<publishedContextNamespace>http://iex.ptin.pt/ctx/gps</
publishedContextNamespace>
<parameterRules>
<parameterRule>
<parameter>latitude</parameter>
<condition lang="regexp" var="">40\.6[2-5]\d*</condition>
</parameterRule>
<parameterRule>
<parameter>longitude</parameter>
<condition lang="regexp" var="">-8\.6[2-7]\d*</condition>
</parameterRule>
</parameterRules>
<timeRule/>
<publishingDelay>0</publishingDelay>
</profile>
<profile id="2" name="Friends Place Tracking">
<publishedContextNamespace>http://iex.ptin.pt/ctx/gps</
publishedContextNamespace>
<parameterRules/>
<timeRule>
<timeOfDayCondition lang="regexp" var="">9|1\d</
timeOfDayCondition>
<weekdayCondition lang="regexp" var="">[2-5]</
weekdayCondition>
<dailyExceptionCondition lang="regexp" var="">0</
dailyExceptionCondition>
</timeRule>
<publishingDelay>0</publishingDelay>
</profile>
</privacyProfiles>
<accessGroups>
<accessGroup id="1" name="Home Appliances">home@openfire</
accessGroup>
<accessGroup id="2" name="Work Colleagues">openfire</accessGroup>
</accessGroups>
<profileGrouplinks>
<link groupId="1" profileId="1"/>
<link groupId="2" profileId="2"/>
</profileGrouplinks>
</privacy>
Example 1. Context Privacy Settings XML Representation
The Context Provider was coded using Java SE 6 and
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Fig. 4. Area in which GPS Location is published for the first Context Profile
two existing Java open source libraries: Smack 3.2.0 [15]
and Sun XACML 1.2 [16]. The provider is able to interpret
the context privacy settings, and to create PubSub nodes and
associated access policies in XACML which are supplied to
the XMPP Server. The XACML policy only defines which
users are allowed to perform a “read” action on a given
resource (PubSub node). When context updates come in from
Context Sources, the provider identifies which are the suitable
nodes to which this information is published, first by checking
the entity to which the context refers to, and then by enforcing
the necessary parameter checks on that context information.
The Context Broker is implemented using Openfire [17],
which defines a plugin architecture that makes it easy to
enforce access control on node discovery and subscription.
Such a plugin was coded, also using the open source Java
library Sun XACML 1.2. The policy for each node is loaded by
the plugin to a simple Policy Decision Point (PDP) implemen-
tation. Whenever a discovery request for PubSub nodes or a
subscription request arrives, the user and resource information
are passed to the PDP in order to get a decision on whether
a resource is accessible or visible to that user.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To test the system a testbed of virtual machines was
setup. The host machine is an Intel Core i7 with 12Gb of
RAM running VMWare ESXi 3.5. Four virtual machines were
created with 512MB of RAM and a single virtual core, to
ease the CPU Usage measurements. In all of them Ubuntu
Linux 11.04 Server edition was installed. Each of the four
machines runs one of the components: Context Source, Con-
text Provider, Context Broker and Context Consumer. For the
Context Source a simple Java-based XMPP client was coded,
that generates random location context at a configured rate.
Similarly, the Context Consumer is a Java-based XMPP client
that subscribes to the target PubSub nodes and writes to a file
the received context marked with a timestamp. The baseline
Context Provider is a simple provider that publishes every
context that receives to nodes that it has configured without
any further processing. The Context Source and Consumer are
synchronized automatically before each test using a local NTP
Fig. 5. Context Provider Average CPU Idleness as Load Increases
Fig. 6. Context Broker Average CPU Idleness as Load Increases
Fig. 7. End-to-End Context Delivery Latency with Load Increases
server.
In each test session a number Context Sources published
context at a fixed rate, and the Consumers got that content
and wrote it with timestamps to a file. Furthermore, the CPU
usage in both the Context Broker and Context Provider was
measured, for both access control and baseline cases. The
CPU measurements are based on the idle CPU output from
vmstat [18]. The output shows average values for a sampling
period that was set to 2 seconds. Since all the virtual machines
only have one core, we don’t have to worry about multi-core
CPU measurement issues. The result gathering was repeated
in 5 sessions to detect odd events. Correlation tests show
that the same behaviour was observed in all test sessions,
1921
with relative standard deviation well below 10% for all cases,
except in Broker CPU measurements with 500 context updates
per second on the Access Control case. In this case the relative
standard deviation reaches almost 15%, due to the Broker not
being able to handle all the load at times. In fact, the Broker
processing load at around 500 contexts updates per second was
the encountered bottleneck for the tested deployment. Figures
5, 6 and 7 show the relevant findings.
As we test with higher load, the average CPU occupation
rises linearly, both for the Provider, as seen in Figure 5, and
for the Broker , shown in Figure 6. In fact, in the Provider
case, the average CPU occupation is practically the same
in both implementations. The only difference is a slightly
bigger memory footprint of the Access Control Provider. In
the Broker, however, the linear increase in CPU demand for
the access control case is clearly faster than for the original
implementation.
To properly analyze the rise in latencies, we have removed
the latency data referring to the first 2 minutes of each session,
both for original and access control cases. The reasoning
for this is that the system takes some ammount of time,
in every case under 2 minutes, to stabilize its performance.
We came to this value from the CPU measurements, which
show substantially higher loads in the first seconds of each
session. Furthermore, since this is meant to be a system that
is always running, the relevant results are the ones we obtain
after the startup. The results are depicted in Figure 7, which
shows that context submitted to access control clearly takes
more time to reach the destination, under any load. However
this additional delay is estimated in around 20ms, a value
perfectly in line within the human perception of “real-time”,
representing roughly 10% of the human visual reaction time
of 190ms.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The authors presented a system capable of distributing
context information in a controlled way that fulfills the real-
time requirements of the process. The system considers fine-
grained context privacy settings, allowing the user to set the
context type and the valid parameters for which information
should be published. Despite the binary result of an access
control decision, allow or deny, complex effects could be
implemented with parameter comparison functions other than
regular expressions, which were chosen for this work. For
example, a profile might be created that only provides the
GPS location based on a probabilistic function centered on
some coordinates. This would result on a “fade effect” of the
location updates. Furthermore, considering status updates to be
context information, a profile that only accepts status updates
in English could be defined.
A bottleneck on the Context Broker was detected when
load increases above certain values. However this is only a
deployment problem which can be mitigated by decoupling the
Publish-Subscribe Service from the XMPP Server. This shall
be considered in the future by the authors, as additional privacy
functionality is added. A key example of such functionality
to be addressed in future work is the use of obfuscation
by chaining context providers based on privacy settings, as
considered in the current architecture. Additionally, the use of
identity management techniques for allowing some degree of
anonymity when publishing context information is also to be
targetted.
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